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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[Sac. No. 5B07. In Bank. Oct. 16, 1944.] 
Estate of CHARLES HENRY STONE RULE, Deceased. 
ALEX McCLUSKEY, Respondent, v. WALLACE L. 
\V ARE et aI.. as Executor~. et.c;. Appellants. 
[1] Decedents' Estates - Executors - Powers - Contracts- With 
Brokers.-Prob. Code, § 7BO, declaring that by the execution 
of a contract between an executor and a broker to secure a 
purchaser no personal liability shall be attached to the execu-
tor and no liability shall be incurred by the estate "unless 
an actual sale is made and confirmed by the court," clearly 
indicates that the sale is not regarded as "made" until it is 
confirmed by the court. Hence, strictly speaking, the pur-
chaser cannot be regarded as "secured" until the sale h.as been 
confirmed, nor is the contract valid or binding for any purpose 
until the sale is confirmed. 
[2a,2b] Brokers-Compensation-Appeal-Review of Edivence • ...;.. 
In a probate proceeding involving the allowance of a broker's 
commission, it was for the determination of the trial court 
whether a contract addressed to the broker and signed by the 
executors,when read in the light of .conflicting inferen'ces to 
be drawn from the contract and- the surrounding circ'umstances, 
evidenced an intention to provide for payment of a .commis~ 
sion to the broker for hi~ pa~t Rerviees in securing a certain 
(1) See HB Cal.Jur. 51;.21 Am.Jur. 505. 
McK. Dig. References: [I. 9-12, 15] Decedents' Estates, § 265; 
[2) Brokers, §160; [3] Appeal and Error, §1172; [4] Contracts, 
UBI; [5] Attorneys, § 25; [BJ Brokers, § 23; [7J Brokers, § 56; 
[8J Brokers. § 53; [13] Statutes. § 192 it [14] Brokers,§ 158. 
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person as a bidder and prospective purchaser, or whether the 
contract contemplated payment for future services only; and 
the court's decision may not be interfered with on appeal. 
[3] Appeal-Presumptions-Findings.-In the absence of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, every intendment is in favor 
of the judgment or order appealed from, and it is presumed 
that every fact or inference essential to the support of the 
order and wRrrRnted by the evidence was found by the court. 
[4] Contracts-Interpretation-Functions of Courts.-An appel-
late court will accept or adhere to the interpretation of a con-
tract adopted by the trial court Rnd not substitute another of 
its own, where parol evideuce is introduced in aid of inter-
pretation of the contract. and where said evidence is such that 
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom. 
[5] Attorneys-Relation to Client-Imputation of Knowledg~.­
Knowledge of an attorney for executors is imputed to the 
executors, 
[6] Brokers-Employment-Contracts Reduced to Writing After 
Performance.-A contract employing a broker to procure a 
purchaser for property of an estate. although signed by the 
executors after the broker's services were performed insofar 
as procuring the purchaser's bid was concerned. but before 
such bid had ripened into a confirmed sale, was legally suffi~ 
cient to satisfy the requirements. if any. of R written authori-
zation. 
[7] Id.-Compensation--Ratification of Broker's Acts-Acceptance 
of Beneflts.-The acts of executors in accepting the benefits of 
a broker's services by petitioning for confirmation of a sale of 
property to the purchaser, after definite notice that the broker 
was the procuring cause of such purchaser's bid. and in there-
after executing a written contract authorizing the broker to 
procure a purchaser for the property, constituted ratification 
of the broker's acts as agent of the executors. and thus en-
ttitled the broker to his commission. 
[8] Id. - Compensation - Construction of Contra,ct.-On appeal 
from an order allowing a broker's commission on sales of 
estate property. a lette; from an inheritance tax appraiser to 
the executors' attorney, which accompanied the form of a 
written contract, later signed by the executors, authorizing 
the broker to procure a purchaser. was construed against 
[3] See 2 Cal.Jur. 852, 870; 10 Cal.Jur. 741; 3 Am.Jur. 516. 
[4] See 6 Cal.Jur. 327; 4 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (1943 rev.) 
146,147. 
[5] See 1 Cal.Jur. 846;'3 Cal.Jur. 611; 5 Am.Jur. 302. 
[7] See 4 Cal.Jur. 578; 8 Am.Jur. 1032. 
I 
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the executors and in favor of the broker, where it was reason-
able for the trial court to conclude, in the light of all the 
circumstances, that the appraiser was an agent of the execu-
tors rather than that he represented the broker; and tl)e con- ' 
tract which, the trial court presumably found,. was prepared 
by the appraiser in a spirit of fairness to the broker, was also 
construed against the executors rather than against the broker. 
"\. 
[9] Decedents' Estates-Executors-Powers-Contracts~ With 
Brokers-Sale on IncreasedPrice.-The authorization to pay 
the commission allowed by Prob. Code. § 761, in case of sale on 
an increased bid made at the time of confirmation to a pur-
chaser not procured by the agent holding the contract, is fixed 
by law and the amount must be fixed by the court. Neither the 
obligation nor the amount is dependent on any express or 
written contract. Rnd t.he statute of frauds has no application. 
[10] Id. -'- Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Con-
struction of Instrument.-In a probate proceeding involving 
the allowance of a broker's commission, a letter from an in-
heritance tax appraiser to the executors' attorney, which ac~' 
companied the form of a contract, later signed by the execu-
tors, authorizing the broker to procure a purchaser for ,the 
estate property, supported the implied views of the trial court 
that the appraiser and the attorney would advise and secure 
for the broker a contract seemingly necessary for a commis-
sion under Prob. Code, § 760, rather than one apparently un-
necessary for a commission under § 761, where the appraiser 
wrote "I have advised him [the broker] that for hisprotec-
tion he should have a formal listing from the executor before 
making a bid in court." 
[11] Id. - Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Con-
struction of Statute.-Prob. Code, § 760, authorizing an execu-
tor to enter into a written contract with any bona fide agent 
to secure a purchaser for property of the estate, does not limit 
the power of an executor to that of contracting to pay for 
services to be performed by the agent in the future, as it is 
apparently contemplated by the statute that the contract shall 
not create any obligation until the sale is confirmed: h'ence 
execution of the contract at any time prior to actual confirma-
tion of the sale would appear to answer the requirements of 
the law. 
[12] Id. - Executors - Powers - Contracts - With Brokers-Con-
struction of Statute.-Prob. Code, § 760, directing that a con-
tract between an executor and an agent "shall provide for the 
payment to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any 
purchaser secured by him of a commission," is broad enough 
to include any prospective purchaser previously solicited to 
'. 
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whom a sale is eventually confirmed. A bidder is not actually 
a purchaser within the meaning of the statute until the sale 
to him has been confirmpil. 
[13] Statutes-Construction-Code Provisions.-Provisions of the 
Probate Code are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effecting its objects and promoting justice. 
[14] Brokers - Compensation - Appeal- Presumptions.-On ap-
peal from an order allowing a broker's commission on sales of 
estate property, the trial court was presumed to have found 
that the parties by their contract intended that in case a sale 
to the purchaser was confirmed, the broker was to be paid a 
commission out of its proceeds. 
[15] Decedents' Estates - Executors - Powers - Contracts-With 
Brokers-Presumptions.-In a probate proceeding involving 
the allowance of a broker's commission, in testing the validity 
of a contract, signed by executors, authorizing the broker to 
procure a purchaser for property of the estate, it was pre-
sumed that the executors were acting fairly and by way of dis-
charge of what they conceived to he their fiduciary ohligations. 
APPEAL from an order 'lf the Superi'lr C'lurt 'lf Sonoma 
County all'lwing a commission on sales of property of a de-
cedent's estate and directing payment there'lf. Hilliard Com-
stock,Judge. Affirmed. 
Young, Hudson & Rabinowitz for Appellants. 
Barrett & McConnell and A. Dal Th'lmson for Respondent. 
Breed, Burpee & Robinson as Amici Curiae 'ln behalf 'lf 
Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-This is an appeal by the executors of the 
last will and testament 'lf Charles H. S. Rule, deceased, from 
an order 'lf the probate court fixing and allowing a broker's 
commission, and directing payment thereof by the executors, 
to respondent real estate broker Alex MoOluskey, \1pon the 
sales to a purchaser secured by respondent of certain real 
and personal property of the Rule estate. The substance of 
appellants' contenti'ln is that the evidence fails to supP'lrt the 
interpretati'ln which the trial C'lurt (sitting in pr'lbate) placed 
UP'ln a written C'lntract between appellants and resP'lndent 
relative to the pr'lcurement of a purchaser, and that there-
fore such court erred in allowing respondent a commission 
Uct.1944] ESTATE OF RULE 
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Qn the sales. We have concluded that the evidence is not as 
a matter of law insufficient t'l sUPPQrt any essential implied 
finding and that the Qrder appealed frQm must be affirmed. 
The resP'lndent Alex McCluskey, dQing business under the 
firm name and style Qf McCluskey RealtyCQmpany, Santa 
RQsa, CalifQrnia, at all times cQncerned was a duly licensed 
real estate brQker and his son C. E. McCluskey was aJicensed 
salesman emplQyed by the father. They carried Qn.their busi~ 
ness cQrrespondence on statiQnery with letterheads shQwing 
their profession. As early as January 16, 1942,resPQndent 
or his son and agent, 'ln their letterhead stationery, wrote to 
H. S. YQung, an attorney whQse firm waR emplQyed as the at-
torneys for the executors in this estate and whQ was handling 
the estate matters on behalf of his firm, stating that "Mr. TQm . 
Brownscombe, Attorney here in Santa Rosa, gave us your 
name stating that y'lU were the att'lrney fQr the Charles Rule 
estate. \Ve have tW'l 'lr three substantial cash buyers for stQck 
ranches and W'luld like to know at an early date if the Rule 
Ranch at Jenner is f'lr sale and your best price. The writer 
has been on the ranch several times and we feel that we are 
fairly familiar with same." On January 20 Mr~ YQung re-
plied as follows: "In response to your, letter of January 16th, 
I beg to encl'lse herewith prospectus on the Rule Ranch. Any 
cattleman who buys this ranch would take Qver theregistra-
ti'lns for the Hereford breeding stock and the well knQwn 
g'lQd will." The prospectus, which, in effect, is an QbviQUS 
sales talk and invitati'ln for bids on the property, accQmpanied 
the letter. 
In August, 1942, in continuation Qf the negotiations which 
had been opened in .January, the agent on behalf Qf the realty 
C'lmpany, 'ln its letterhead, wrQte to Young fQr, and the latter 
in resPQnsemailedtQhim.aninventQry Qf the livestQck and 
equipment Qn the Rule Ranch. In the m§l:tntime t4e fl-gent h,fl-q 
contacted one LoulM T. WilU", lu~d jiJu(!c@@d@d in int@tieMtlnr 
him in 'PurClhaling the property a.nd.. d.urinA' the tatie 'Plft 
Qf August, was, with the father. respondent herein, enga~ed· 
in assisting Willig to obtain financing fQr the purchase. On 
August 24 Willig, whQ had jUl'lt learned that Qne Qf the execu-
tQrs was one W. P. Wobber,a personal acquaintance of his, 
inquired Qf the agent whether the . latter WQuld . QbjectJ:!: ,he,· 
Willig; saw WQbber persQnally concerning the prQperty; 'and 
received the. agent's permission tQdo SQ. There was no sug-
• 
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gestion that either Willig or the agent intended that by per-
mitting the personal contact the latter should be understood 
to waive his obvious expectancy of earning and receiving a 
commission on any sale which might ensue to his client. The 
agent and Willig thereafter made arrangements to meet at 
the former's office (that of the McCluskey Realty Company) 
in Santa Rosa on September 2, 1942, and then to proceed to 
a nearby bank to discuss financing of the proposed purchase. 
Willig failed to appear at the real estate office the morning of 
the date set, and in the afternoon the agent inquired of the 
bank whether Willig had been there. He was informed that 
Willig had come to the bank that morning (September 2), 
that they had "gotten together" on the financing, and that 
Willig had stated he was not going to file a bid through the 
realty company-through whose efforts, as related; his interest 
in the ranch had been aroused and who had carried on the 
preliminary negotiations which led to the financing arrange-
ments. The agent forthwith telephoned Young, attorney for 
the executors, and informed him "that Mr. Willig had not 
kept an appointment with us that day and that I telephoned 
Mr. Fuller [the banker] and had asked him if Mr. Willig had 
been there and he stated that he had. And I further asked 
him [Fuller] if they had gotten together on any financing 
and he told me they had. And I then-and also that I had 
been advised by Mr. Fuller that Mr. Willig had stated he 
wasn't going to file a bid through us. . So I told Mr. Young 
that we very definitely wanted to register Mr. Willig's name 
with him and Mr. Young told me to write him, accordingly, 
so he should be sure he would have it the following morning, 
which morning, I believe, was the date the bids were to be 
opened, so I did so, and sent it special delivery." (Italics 
added. ) The letter written by the agent to Young was dated 
September 2, 1942, and reads as follows: "On January 20th 
you wrote us, enclosing a prospectus of the Rule Ranch, offer-
ing it for sale. With this authority, we contacted Mr. L. J. 
Willig, 38-8th St., San Francisco, and have for some little 
time discussed the ranch with him. When Mr. Thomas 
Brownscombe of Santa Rosa [who apparently was acting as 
an agent or representative for the executors] advised us that 
bids under the probate sale were being solicited we immedi-
ately sought to interest Willig in filing a bid. It seems that 
following our conversation in this regard he contacted Mr. 
'Vobber and was advised that .•. no real estate brokers 
.. ~ 
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had been invited to solicit bids upon the property. [If this 
statement was made by WobbeI' the trial court could have 
found that it was untrue, as is shown by the correspondence 
above quoted in which Mr. Young, as agent for the executors, 
impliedly invited the claimant here to solicit a bidder for the 
property.] 
"Upon Tues., Aug. 25, we again contacted Mr. \yillig, by 
appointment, and discussed the possibilities of financing' the. 
purchase and the amount of his proposed bid. In the mean- . 
time we had ascertained from one of our local banks what . 
they would loan him on the property. Yesterday, Sept. 1, we 
'phoned Mr. Willig, making an appointment to meet him at 
our office following an interview he proposed to have with 
Mr. Fuller, Pres. of the Bank of Sonoma County at Sebasto-
pol. Mr. Willig failed to appear at our office and upon our 
'phoning Mr. Fuller we were advised that Mr. Willig had· 
told him of our contact with him but that . . . he was going 
to file directly with Mr. WobbeI'. 
"We feel very definitely that under the circumstances if 
Mr. Willig does file a bid it should be regarded as being subject 
to our commission." (Italics added.) 
Under date of September 5, 1942, Yourig replied as follows: 
"I have your letter of September 2nd. The executors have 
not yet made any return on the Rule Ranch sale, so as I write 
this letter it is questionable as to who will be the successful· 
bidder. While it is most agreeable to us to deal with brokers 
nevertheless this bid came directly from the purchaser and 
not through any broker, as a net bid. I think you will fully 
understand as the attorney for the estate there is nothing I 
can do concerning your commission." (Italics added.) The 
statement in the above quoted letter that "this bid came di- . 
rectly from the purchaser and not through any broker" is 
apparently true only in a limited and technical sense. The 
evidence amply supports a finding that the bid came through 
the efforts of the broker who contacted and interested the 
bidder and carried on negotiations with him as shown above. 
The statement that the proposal came "as a net bid" is, of 
course, a conclusion of the writer of the letter, not binding 
on Mr. McCluskey or the court. 
On September 12, 1942, the executors, knowing that the 
broker had actually procured the bid and that he would claim 
a commission on the sale if confirmed, through Young's law 
'. 
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firm filed in the probate court two returns of sale-one of the 
ranch and the other of certain stock and other personal prop-
erty thereon. The returns recited that Willig had become the 
prospective purchaser of the real property for $75,000 and of 
the personal property. for $20,000, and prayed that the sales 
to him be confirmed. Oourt hearings thereon were set for 
September 25. 
On September 22 the above mentioned Mr. Thomas M. 
Brownscombe, an attorney and inheritance tax appraiser in 
Santa Rosa, at whose office the executors in this estate had 
specified that bids for the . ranch property should be filed, 
wrote to Young in San Francisco as follows: "Dear Harry: 
Mr. Alex McOluskey, a broker of this city, has one or more 
prospective purchasers for the Rule ranch and personal prop-
erty. I have advised him that for his protection he should 
have a formal listing from the executor before making a bid 
in court. Accordingly I enclose herewith a form of contract 
to be signed by the executor. If it meets with your approval 
would you kindly have it signed and return it to me." 
The form of. contract referred to in this letter was, under 
date of September 23, 1942, signed by the two executors, and, 
prior to the hearings on September 25 of the petitions for 
confirmation of the proposed sales, was delivered to the re-
spondent. It is addressed to the respondent, dated September 
23, 1942, and the body of it reads as follows: 
"This will authorize you to procure a purchaser for the 
real and personal property of the estate of OHARLES H. S.· 
RULE, deceased, a petition for the confirmation of the sale 
of which has been heretofore filed in the Superior Court of 
Sonoma County. A commission will be paid you out of the 
proceeds of a sale to any purchaser secured by you in an 
amount to be fixed and allowed by the court upon confirma-
tion of the sale." It is signed, "Very truly yours, Wallace 
L. Ware Executor. W. P. WobbeI' Executor." 
Obviously the executors in signing the quoted contract did 
not regard the property as having been actually sold. No 
other bids were made at the time of the court hearings on 
September 25, and on that date Mr. Willig's bids were con-
sidered by the court and the sales to him confirmed. By 
stipulation of the parties the hearing on respondeht's appli-
cation for broker's commissions was continued to October 2. 
Subsequent continuances placed the actual hearing on such' 
Oct. 1944] ESTATE OF RULE 
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~pplication on November 27,1942. In the meantime the ·e~ecu~. 
tors filed a third return of sale, reciting that certain additional 
personal property on the' ranch had been sold by them to 
Willig for $2,300 and praying confirmatioh of the sale. Hear-
ing on such return was also set for November 27, and on that 
date the sale to Willig was confirmed. On December 22. 1942, 
the court, having received evidence. including the correspond-
ence above quoted and the testimony of Mr. C. E. McCluSkey 
and Mr. H. S. Young, without written findings made its order 
that a broker's commission of $4,865 (five per cent of the 
total sales price of $97,300) be. allowed to respondent and 
that the executors forthwith pay to respondent such commis-
sion out of the proceeds of the sales then in the hands of the 
executors. 
Appellants contend: 
First, that the contract embodied in the letter of Septem. 
bel' 23, 1942, addressed to respondent broker and signed by 
the two appellant executors evidences no intention by the 
executors to pay to respondent a commission for services which 
the latter had already performed, viz., the procuring of 
Willig as .a bidder and prospective purchaser for the estate 
property; and that such contract should be construed as re-
ferring to future or other bidders to be produced by re-
spondent. 
Second. that, in any event, the authority granted appel-
lants by section 760 of the Probate Code to contract to pay a 
commission to a real estate agent out of the proceeds of the 
sale of estate property to any purchaser secured by such agent 
is by the terms of that section limited to services to be per-
formed and purchasers to be secured by the agent in the 
future, and that appellants were without power to contract 
to pay for services already rendered by an agent. 
[1] Section 760 of the Probate Code, upon which each of 
the parties hereto relies, provides as follows: "The executor 
or administrator may enter into a written contract with any 
bona fide agent to secure a purchaser for any real or personal 
property of the estate, which contract shall provide for the 
payment. to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any 
purchaser secured by him of a commission the amount of 
which must be fixed and allowed by the court upon confirma-
tion of the sale; and when said sale is confirmed to such pur-
chaser, such contract shall be binding and valid as against the 
• 
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estate for the amount so allowed by the court. By the execu-
tion of any such contract no personal liability shall attach to 
the executor or administrator, and no liability of any kind 
shall be incurred by the estate unless an actual sale is made and 
confirmed by the court." (Italics added.) The above itali-
cized language providing against liability "unless an actual 
sale is made and confirmed by the court" clearly indicates 
that in the contemplation of the statute the sale is not re-
garded as "made" unless and until it is confirmed by the 
court. Hence, strictly speaking, the purchaser cannot be re-
garded as "secured" until the sale has been confirmed. nor. 
by the other italicized language of the section, is the contract 
valid or binding for any purpose unless and until the sale is 
confirmed. 
[2&] Appellants, in support of their first contention-that 
the contract by its own words clearly contemplates payment 
to respondent for futures services only-urge the right of the 
trial court in construing the contract to consider the "sur-
rounding circumstances and the matter to which" the con-
tract relates, and particularly the expressions contained in 
the letter of September 22 to Young from Brownscombe 
(whom appellants designate as respondent's attorney and 
agent) with which the contnct form was forwarded to Young 
for signing by appellant executors. The fact is, however. that 
the trial court had before it and undoubtedly did consider 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances, including the 
Brownscombe letter, and yet determined that respondent 
broker was entitled to his earned commission. [3] And. in 
the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, every 
intendment is in favor of the judgment or order appealed 
from and it is presumed that every fact or inference essential 
to the support of the order and warranted by the evidence 
was found by the court. (See Haime v. de Beaulieu (1942), 
20 Oa1.2d 849, 852 [129 P.2d 345] ; Belcins Van Lines, Inc. v. 
Johnson (1942),21 Oal.2d 135, 137 [130 P.2d 421] ; Estate of 
Shaw (1927), 85 Oal.App. 518. 525 [260 P. 351]; 2 Oal.Jur. 
852, § 499; 10 Oal.Jur. 741; § 62.) [2b] Whether, in the 
light of the conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evi. 
dence, the parties by their contract intended to provide for 
the payment to respondent of a commission for his past ser-
vices-which had not yet matured into a confirmed sa1e and 
which, hence, in one sense, were services in course of rendi-
ti?n-in securing Willig as a bidder and prospective pur-
f 
;> 
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chl1£er, or contemplated payment for future services only, was 
for the determination of the trial court and its decision may 
not be interfered with by us on appeal. [4] The rule is that 
an "appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpreta· 
tion [of a contract] adopted by the trial court-and not sub-
stitute another of its own- ... where .parol evidence was 
introduced in aid of its interpretation, and such eviden~e . . . 
h such that confiicting inferences may be drawn therefrom." 
(4 Oal.Jur. 10·Yr. Supp. (1943 rev.) 146-147, § 192; see also 
2 Oal.Jur. 934-939. § 549.) Oertainly inferences may be drawn 
from the contract and the surrounding circumstances here 
which would support the finding which we must presume was 
made by the trial court relat.ive to the intention of the con-
tracting parties. . 
[5] From the date of the first communication (January, 
1942) between respondent or his agent on the one hand and 
Young, as attorney for the executors, on the other, it was 
known to Young and through him to the executors (1 OaI.· 
JUl'. 846-847. § 125; 3 Oal.Jur. 611, § 25; Laukkare v. Abram-
son (1935), 9 OaI.App.2d 447, 449 r50 P.2d 478] ; Smith v" 
Thomsen (1935), 8 Oal.App.2d 603, 606 [48 P.2d 102]) that 
respondcnt's realty company was interested in securing a pur- . 
chaser for the estate property and in thereby earning a com-
mission. [6] The evidence shows that Mr. Young, and, con~ 
sequcntly, the executors. knew at the time Willig's bid was reo 
ceiver1 that he had been secured by respondent as a prospec-
tive purchaser and they (Young and the executors) had been 
specifically notified. prior to the time that they determined 
to aCtlept Willig's bid and prior to their filing in court of the. 
petitions to confirm the sales to him. of that fact and of the 
fact that respondent claimed to be ~ntitled to a commission 
for his services performed Thereafter appellant executors, 
filed the petitions for confirmation arid. prior to the hearing' 
on such petitions, executed the contract under which the trial, 
court presumably awarded a commission to respondent. It 
has been consistently held in this state. following the. lan-
guage of Mu,ir v. Kane (1909), 55 Wash. 131. 135~136 r104 
P. 153, 19 Ann.Oas. 1180, 26 L.R.A. N.S. 519] that "The moral 
obligation to pay for services rendered as a broker in selling 
real estate under an oral contract. where the statute requires, 
such contract to he in writing. is just as binding as is the 
moral' obligation to pay a debt that has become barred by the 
":" 
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statute of limitations; and there is no reason for holding that 
the latter will support a new promise to pay while the former 
will not. There is no moral delinquency that attaches to an 
oral contract to sell real property as a broker. This service 
cannot be recovered for because the statute says the promise 
must be in writing, not because it is illegal in itself. It was not 
intended by the statute to impute moral turpitude to such 
contracts. The statute was intended to prevent frauds and 
perjuries, and, to accomplish that purpose, it is required that 
the evidence of the contract be in writing; but it is not condu-
cive to either fraud or perjury to say that the services re~­
dered under the void contract or voluntary will support a 
subsequent written promise to pay for such services." (Ital-
ics added.) See Coulter v. Howard (1927),203 Cal. 17,22-23 
[262 P. 751]; In re Balfour & Garrette (1910), 14 Cal.App. 
261, 265-266 [111 P. 615] ; Can'ington v. Smithers (1915), 26 
Cal. App. 460, 463-464 [147 P. 225]; Kinney v. Jos. Herspring 
& Co. (1921), 53 Cal.App. 628, 638 [200 P. 737]; Pryor v. 
McGuire (1922), 59 Cal.App. 234, 239-240 [210 P. 532]; 
Johnson v. Krier (1922). 59 Ca1.App. 330, 332 [210 P. 966]. 
Consequently the contract executed after the services of re-
spondent were performed insofar as procuring the making of 
the bid was concerned. but before such bid had ripened into 
a confirmed saJe, was legally sufficient to flatisfy the require-
ment, if any, of a written authorization. 
[7] Moreover, the acts of the executors in accepting the 
benefits of respondent's services by petitioning for confirma-
tion of the sale to Willig (until which confirmation, as previ-
ously noted. there could be no binding obligation to pay a 
·commission), after definite notice that respondent was the 
procuring cause of Willig's bid, and in thereafter executing 
the written contract of September 23. constituted ratification· 
of the acts of respondent as agent of the executors in the 
same manner (i. e .• in writing) as it is claimed was required 
for a precedent authorization. and thus entitled respondent 
broker to his commission. (See 4 CaJ..Jur. 578-579. ~ 22.) 
[8] Appellants charge that certain expressions contained 
in the letter of September 22 from Brownscombe. to Young 
(which accompanied the form of written contract executed 
September 23) indicate that the contract contemplated pay-
ment to respondent for future services only. that in writing 
such letter and preparing the contract Brownscombe was act-
.. ~~-~-----~----------------
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ing as attorney and agent for respondent, that therefore re-
spondent is bound by the letter, and that, moreover, 'the con-
tract should be most strongly construed against respondent, 
whose attorney, claim appellants, prepared it. The record, 
however, is devoid of evidence (unless it is to be inferred from 
the letter itself) that Brownscombe at any time acted as 
either attorney or agent for respondent. On the contrary, 
it was in Brownscombe's office that the executors had by. pub-
lished notice specified that bids for' the estate property were 
to be filed and the Return of Sale of Real Estate and Petition 
for Confirmation alleges that the sale was made "at the place 
specified in said notice. to wit: care of Mr. Thomas M. 
Brownscombe, Exchange Bank Building, Santa Rosa, Cali-
fornia." It W;1S logical and reasonable for the trial court to 
conclude, in the light of all the circumstances, that Browns-
combe waR an agent of appellants rather than that he repre-
sented respondent. Therefore, thE' language of Browns-
combe's letter must be construed against appellants and in 
favor of respondent. Likewise the contract which was exe-
cuted by appellants certainly is not necessarily shown to have 
been formulated by respondent or by anyone acting as his 
agent or representative. It was forwarded to Mr. Young 
by Mr. Brownscombe and, the trial court presumably found. 
was prepared by Mr. Brownscombe in a spirit of fairness to 
Mr. McCluskey, although acting as the agent of the executors ... 
Fair dealing in private transactions is to be presumed. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1963 (19).) Such contract, therefore, also is to 
be construed against the appellant!'! rather than against 
respondent. [9] It may also be noted that although appellants argue 
that the contract was prospective only and was intended by 
the parties thereto to cover only future services to be re-
dered by respondent, i. e., the production of increased bids 
in court at the time of hearing on the petitions for confirma-
tion of the sales to Willig, no express contract is required by 
the Probate Code in order to entitle to a commission a broker 
producing a purchaser to whom. upon an increased bid in 
open court. the sale is confirmed. Under such circumstances. 
by the provisions of section 761 of the Probate Code, such 
broker is entitled to commission on the full purchase price 
for which the sale i!'! confirmed. les!'! one-halI of the commi!'!-
sion on the original bid. The authorization to pay this com-
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mission is fixed by law and the amount must be fixed by the 
court. Neither the obligation nor the amount is dependent 
on any express or written contract. The commission is sim-
ply allowed as a judicial act, an incident of an order of the 
court confirming the sale. The statute of frauds has no appli-
cation, as the right to the commission is not based on a· con-
tract, at least not on any express contract. (Prob. Code, 
§ 761; see, also, Halleck v. Guy (1858), 9 Cal. 181, 195 r70 
Am.Dec. 643J.) Both Brownscombe and Young were attor-
neys practicing their profession in this state, and it may have 
seemed more probable to the trial judge that they would par-
ticipate in advising and securing for Mr. McCluskey a con. 
tract seemingly necessary for a commission under section 760 
rather than one apparently unnecessary for a commission un-
der section 761. 
[10] The language of Brownscombe's letter, previously 
mentioned. support!'! the implied views of the trial court. 
In the letter Mr. Brownscombe says, "I have advised him 
[Mr. McCluskeyJ that for his protection he should have a 
formal listing from the executor before making a· bid in court. 
Accordingly r enclose herewith a form of contract to be signed 
by the executor. If it meets with your approval would you 
kindly have it signed and return it to me." (Italics added.) 
While conflicting inferences may be drawn it is apparent· that 
the trial court could have considered as significant the fact 
that Mr. McCluskey. would need no protection in the shape of 
a written contract for a commission on a sale which might be 
cotlfirmed to a new bidder in open court on proceedings initi-
ated to confirm a sale to a, previous bidder. No "approval'" 
by Mr. Young or the executors would be necessary to entitle 
him to the commission OIl such a proceeding. f.Jikewise the 
statement in the Brownscombe letter that Mr. McCluskey had 
"one or more prospecth-e pUrchaser!'! for the Rule rancll and 
personal property" was a prOpel" and correct reference to 
Mr. Willig and, the trial court was warranted in finding, Mr. 
Young and the executors knew it. Willig, obviously, was a 
"prospective purchaser" until the proposed sales to him had 
been confirmed. The statement in the letter that in Mr. 
Brownscombe's opinion Mr. McCluskey should have "a formal 
listing ... before ,making a bid in court" may be presumed 
to have been interpreted by the trial court as referring to the 
actual presentation in court of Mr~ Willig's bids in asking 
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confirmation thereon. The fact that Mr. Young had previ-
ously written respondent that "this bid came directly -from 
the purchaser and not through any broker . • . I think you 
will fully understand as the attorney for the estate there is 
nothing I can do concerning your commission," did not pre-
clude him from subsequently recognizing the technicality of 
his .own position and the apparent fairness and justice of re" 
spondent's claim or from changing his mind and advising 
his clients to execute the contract. 
[11] Appellants seek to sustain their second contention-
that, as executors, they were without authority to contract 
to pay a commission to respondent for the' procuring of a.' 
purchaser whose bid had already been returned to the court 
for confirmation-by reliance, upon the doctrine, enunciated 
in Perry v. Superior Oourt(1938), 29 Cal.App.2d 114,_ 116 
[84 P.2d 250], that "the administration of the estate of de-
ceased persons is purely statutory, and the procedure out-
lined in the statutes is controlling. When the powers an.d' 
duties of the administrator are fixed by statute there is no 
inherent right to assume or exercise any power not conferred, 
or to depart from the procedure outlined." (See, also, 11a 
Cal.Jur. 86-87, § 35.) They assert that the opening words 
of section 760 of the Probate Code, i. e., "The executors ... 
may enter into a written contract with any bona fide ageilt to 
secure a purchaser for any real 'or personal property of the 
estate," limit the power of an executor to that of contractinlf 
to pay for services to be performed by the agent in the fu~' 
ture and that he is not empowered to agree to pay for past. 
services-in this case the procuring of a bid which appellant 
executors had accepted but which the court had not yet col'l~ 
firmed. Respondent,. however, urgef!l' that a purchaser ha~" 
not been "secured" within., the meaning of section 760 until, 
a sale ,has been. completed' by court confirmation and: fixing' ,; 
of the amount of commission to be ailowed, and· that' tiritit· 
that time the executors may execute the contract 'authoriied' 
by the sectlon and may thereby bind the estate to the pay~" 
:ment of the commission fixed by the court upon confirmatio:r1.' 
Actually, the estate is not bound by any such contract until 
and unless the proposed sale is confirmed by the court and 
then the commission is payable only out of the proceeds of 
the· sale. , The section in question itself provides that uwken' 
.,' 
/;' 
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said sale is confirmed to such purchaser, such contract shall 
be binding and valid as against the estate." (Italics added.) 
It apparently is contemplated that the contract shall not 
create any obligation until the sale is so confirmed. Hence 
execution of the contract at any time prior to actual confirma-
tion of the sale would appear to answer the requirements of 
the law. [12] Furthermore, it is to be noted that the sec-
tion directs that the contract "shall provide for the payment 
to such agent out of the proceeds of a sale to any purchaser 
secured by him of a commission ... " (Italics added.) This 
language is broad enough to include any prospective pur-
chaser previously solicited to whom a sale is eventually con-
firmed. A bidder is not actually a purchaser within the 
. meaning of the statute until the sale to him has been 
confirmed. 
In Wilson v. Fleming (1930), 106 Cal.App. 542, 549 [289 
P. 658], the court in construing the first two paragraphs of 
section 1559 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the same, ex-
cept for immaterial changes, as present Probate Code sec-
tion 760), held that "not until ... a deed is passed and a 
mortgage or deed of trust taken for such payments as are 
deferred, has a sale been actually comple,ted within the mean-
ing of section 1559 [of the Code of Civil Procedure]." And 
as defined .by Webster's New International Dictionary (1943 
ed.), "to secure" is "to acquire certainly." In 56 Corpus 
Juris 1275~1276 the verb "secure" is stated to mean "to 
acquire certainly, ... to confirm." 
[13] Moreover, provisions of the Probate Code are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to 
promote justice. (Estate of Paterson (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 
305, 315-316 [93 P.2d 825].) It appears that such a construc-
tion was adopted by this court in the recent case of Estate of 
Mitchell (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 48 [123 P.2d 503], in which a 
broker was awarded a commission on a sale of estate property 
to a purchaser secured by him under a contract (in the form 
of a letter) which failed to make expreSs provision for pay-
ment of any commission whatever, either out of proceeds of 
the sale or from any other source. In affirming the award 
this court, speakip.g through Mr. Justice Shenk,stated (pp. 
50-51), "Although the parties did not expressly provide for 
a commission it is not seriously questioned that a commission 
was intended if a sale was consummated and confirmed by 
~ 
~i 
i 
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the court. The exchange of letters clearly indicated that a 
commission waH contemplated. A st.atement therein of the 
amount of the commission would be nugatory, for the reason 
that the statute requires the court to fix thecommission upon 
the confirmation of the sale .... Furthermore the words, , [the 
contract 1 shall provide for the payment to such agent out of 
the proceeds of a sale to any purchaser secured by him of a 
commission ... ' as used in this section [Prob. Code, § 760] 
are not necessarily mandatory .•.. [Po 52] We conclude that 
the statute effects the inclusion of the limitation in the con-
tract and that failure to include it in the writing does not 
render the contract void." [14] In the instant case the 
trial court must be presumed to have found that the parties 
by their contract of September 23 intended that in case 
the sale to Willig was confirmed respondent· was to be paid 
a commission out of i.ts proceeds. The evidence and the law 
support the conclusion that in so executing such contract the 
executors .acted fairly and did not transcend their authority. 
[15] In testing the validity of the contract and the obliga-
tionof the estate in this proceeding it is also presumed that 
they are acting fairly and by way of discharge of what they 
conceive to be their fiduciary obligations as executors. 
For the reasons above stated the order appealed from is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The majority opinion holds that 
this court is bound by the implied interpretation of the agree-
ment of September 23, 1942, by the trial court, because 
"[conflicting] inferences may be drawn from the contract and 
the surrounding circumstances." . The very possibility of 
what the majority opinion calls conflicting inferences, actu~ 
ally conflicting interpretations, far from relieving the ap~ 
pellate court of the responsibility of interpretation, signalizes 
the necessity of its assuming that responsibility. It is es-
tablished that in the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence 
the appellate court must make its own" interpretation of the 
instrument, displacing the interpretation of the trial C(lurt 
if they are inconsistent. (Estate of Platt, 21 Ca1.2d '343, 352 
[131 P.2d 825] ; Moffatt v. Tight, 44 Cal.App.2d 643, 648 [112 
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P.2d 910] ; Mitchel v. Brown, 43 Cal.App.2d 217, 222 [110 
P.2d 456] ; Texas 00. v. Todd, 19 Cal.App.2d 174 [64 P.2d 
1180J; Wall v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 33 Cal.App.2d 112 
[91 P.2d 145] ; see O'Oonnor v. West Sacramento 00., 189 Cal. 
7, 18 [207 P. 527] ; Oalifornia W. D. 00. v. Oalifornia M. O. 
00., 178 Cal. 337,341 [177 P. 849]; Brant v. Oalifornia 
Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128, 133 [48 P.2d 13]; 5 C.J.S. 32, 722, 
751.) If the extrinsic evidence is conflicting, the trial court, 
having seen and heard the witnesses, is in a better position 
to evaluate that' evidence, and its interpretation of the in-
strument is ordinarily conclusive. (See 111 A.L.R. 742.) 
Even then, however, the appellate court will determine the 
reasonableness of the trial court's interpretation based on 
its findings as to extrinsic facts. (Melvin v. Berendsen, 7 Cal. 
App.2d 389,391 [46 P~2d 189]; Ballsun v. Star Petroleum 
00., 105 Cal.App. 679, 685 [288 P. 437]; Fowle v. Bigelow, 
10 Mass. 379.) 
In interpreting a written agreement, the court must ascer-
tain the meaning of the words and other manifestations of 
intention forming the agreement. (Restatement: Contracts: 
§ 226; 3 Williston, On Contracts [1936] p. 1726.) It must 
consider the usual meaning of the words, the circumstances in 
which they were used, and the reasons for their use. This 
function is a judicial one, even though it "may not involve 
any question of law in the exact sense" (Thayer, Preliminary 
Treatise on Evidence, p. 204) to be exercised according to the 
generally accepted canons of interpretation so that the main 
purpose of the instrument may be given effect. (See Civ. 
Code, §§ 1635-1661; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856-1866.) Factual 
and legal elements are so closely interwoven that there can be 
no effective review of the trial court's interpretation unless the 
appellate court goes through the whole process of interpre-
tation. Otherwise conflicting decisions of trial courts, in the 
event one party has made identical agreements with other 
parties, would have to be affirmed by the appellate courts, 
which would be bound by any number of conflicting inter-
pretations of the same agreement. 
In the present case there was no conflict in the extrinsic 
evidence. This court is therefore bound to make its own in-
terpretation of the agreement of September 23, 1942. That 
agreement was the only one existing between the parties, for 
the correspondence between respondent and the attorney for 
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the estate before September 23, 1942, consisting Qf requests 'fat 
information by the respondent and answers by the exeClitorsj 
'did not constitute a contract authorizing or employing "ref 
spondent to procure a purchaser. (ilforrillv. Barneson,i 30, 
Cal.App.2d 598 [86 P.2d 924]; Lambert v. Gerner, 142 CaL. 
399 [76 P, 53]; Kleinsorge & Heilbron v. Liness, 17 Cal.App. ,,' 
534. 536 [120 P. 444]; see 4 CaLJur. 554.) The agreemeniof' 
September 23, 1942, read in the light of the previousrejectiori 
of respondent's claim for a commission on the, sales to Willig 
and the Brownscombe'letter with which the form, of contract . 
signed by them was sent to the executors,' is open to ,only; 
one reasonable interpretation, namely, that it authorized :re-
spondent to procure a new pur:chaser and promised a coin. '0' 
mission payable out of the proceeds of any sale to such pur· 
chaser. The text of the agreement, authorizing respondent 
to procure a purchaser and promising a commission in the 
event of a sale to such purchaser. could not relate to Willig, 
who had already bought the property and severed his' rela-
tionship with respondent. It clearly shows that the partieR 
intended to provide for a commission for future and not for 
past services. Any doubt as to that intention is removed 
by the Brownscombe letter: "Mr. Alex McCluskey, a broker 
of this city, has one or more prospective purchasers for the 
Rule ranch and personal property. I have advised him for 
his protection he should have a formal listing from the execu-
tor before making a bid in court." Since Willig at that time' 
was known to both parties to have purchased the property 
subject to confirmation by the court and to have severed his 
relationship with respondent, he was neither a purchaser 
whom respondent "has" nor "one or more" purchaserS nor 
a "prospective purchaser." The advice that respondent se-
cure a formal listing for its own protection before "making a 
bid in court" undoubtedly related to the provision in section 
785 of the Probate Code allowing the court in its discretion 
to accept a bid of at least ten per cent more than the price 
named in the return of sale, if made to the court by a responsi-
ble person before confirmation of the return sale. A promise 
of a commission in this event was .I1ot necessary as the ma-
jority opinion assumes, for section 761 of the Probate Code 
limits the commission to one-half only if there are two brokers, 
one who has procured the original purchaser, 'and the other 
who has procured the purchaser who makes the higher bid. 
?¢ 
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If . there is oilly one broker, namely the one who secured the 
purchaser making the higher bid on which a confirmed sale 
is made, section 761 would not apply and the broker would 
be entitled to the full commission if he had secured a written 
contract pursuant to section 760. Moreover, it cannot be as~ 
sumed that the parties believed that a written promise of a 
commission was unnecessary with respect to bids in court. 
In the absence of other authority clearly in point, Srowns-
combe may have relied for his advice on the statement in Cali-
fornia Jurisprudence (11B Cal.Jur. 53 § 667), a widely used 
encyclopedia of California law, that brokers, who procure a 
bid in court on their own responsibility, cannot be allowed a 
commission out of the estate, citing Hickman-Coleman Co. v. 
Leggett, 10 Cal.App. 29 [100 P. 1072]; Estate of Strybing, 
5 Cof.Prob.Dec. 438. The parties were properly advised to 
remove any uncertainty in this respect by executing the 
instrument in question. If respondent had intended that the 
instrument provide for a commission for the sale to Willig, 
he would have said so, assuming of course that he did not in-
tend to lull the executors into the belief that the agreement 
related to the procuring of a new purchaser and to use the in-
strument as a basis for a claim for a commission on the Willig 
sales. Such an intent would be of no avail, for respondent 
could not attain by a trick what had been denied him when 
he asked for it. (Civ. Code, §§ 1640, 1649, 1654; Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1864; Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128, 
133 [48 P.2d 13]; Pacific Lumber Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
22 Ca1.2d 410, 422 [139 P.2d 892]; McClintick v. Leonards, 
103 Cal.App. 768, 774 [285 P. 351] ; see 4 Cal. Jur. Ten-year 
Supp., 1943 revision, 135.) 
Tlle record show'S that respondent at the trial vigorously ob-
jected t.o the admission of the Brownscombe letter in evidence. 
Since 11e now contends that the letter was not admissible it is 
necessary to determine the question whether the letter w~s ad-
missible as extrinsic evidence in aid of the interpretation of 
the agreement of September 23, 1942. Respondent contends 
that the promise of a commission in the instrument of Septem-
ber 23rd covered the sares to Willig and that in view of the 
clear, common meaning of the language used, the promise can-
not be otherwise interpreted. Even if it be assumed that the 
instrument of September 23rd would seem unambiguous to a 
read.er unfamiliar with the circumstances surrounding its ex-
ecutIOn, appellants wol1ld not be precluded from showing the 
.,./,. , 
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meaning intended by the parties, and the court could still' 
interpret the instrument in accord with that int~ntion. 
The main purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the' 
intention of the parties at the time of contracting (Civ. Code, 
§ 1636; Universal Sales Corp. v. California, etc., Mfg. Co., 20 
Ca1.2d 751,760 [128 P.2d 665] ; Bader v. Coale, 48 Cal.App.2d 
276 [119 P.2d 763]; see 6 Cal.Jur. 255. 4 Cal.Jur. Ten-year 
Supp .• 1943 revision. 107). This purpose would be defeated if 
it could not be determined what the parties meant when the 
language of their coritract seems unambiguous to the genera] 
reader unaware I)f the circumstances under which the contract 
was executed, who bases his underAtanding of the language ex-
clusively on his knowledge of the meaning of the words in 
common usage. (Ermolieff v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, 19 Cal. 
2d 543. 550 [122 P.2d 31.) Though language that appears 
unambiguous to the general reader gives rise to an inference· 
that the partieA used the language in its ordinary meaning,. 
the inference may be rebutted by evidence that· the parties 
used the words in queAtion in a different sense. <Code Civ.· 
Proc., § 1861: Civ. Code. § 1636: Weinstein v. Moers. 207 Cal. 
534 [279 P. 444]; Shean v. Weeks. 176 Cal. 592 [169P 2:l1l;' 
see McBaine, The Rttle· A_!Jainst Disturbing the Plain 11 Mn~ 
ing of Writings, 31 Ca1.L.Rev. 145. 149.) Otherwise "the 
meaning of the peopie who did not write the document" would 
deterniine it~ i.nterpretation (Ree 9 Wigmore. Rvidence. 4th; 
. ed., § 2462), and the' intention of the parties might be nullV 
fied (Weinstein v. Moers, supra, at p. 540) in violation of the 
proviAionR of AectionR lR56.1860. 1861 of the Code of Civil ' 
Procedure and Rectiom: 1636 and 1647 of the Civil (lode~ 
which are applicable not only when an ambiguity appears 
to the reader from the face of the instrument. but also when' 
there is an "extrinAic ambiguity" .<code biv.Proc.,~'185G~ 
Rubd. 2), namely. an ambiguity th~t arises when theinRtrd~ 
ment iR read in the light oiaB thecircumstance.'1 surroundirtg 
itF! prep&ration. (Pacific Indemnity Co. v. California Elecfric', 
Works .• 29 Cal.Apn.2d 260:272 r84 P.2d 3131. )AA the United 
States Supreme Court declared in Reed v. Merchant~'M1ttt 
Ins. Co .• 95 U.S. 23. 30 r24 fJ.'Ed. 3481; "Although a written . 
agreement cannot be varied by Addition or Rubtractioli :by 
proof or the circumstances out of which it grew and which 
Rui-rounded itA adoption. vet such circumstances ftre constantly. 
reF!orted to for the purp~se of aAcertainingthesubject matte-r 
and the Atandpoint of the partieA in relation thereto. Without 
some knowledge derived from such evidence, it would be im-
:, ,~i 
,,:,,;;, 
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possible to comprehend the meaning of an instrument or the 
effect of the words of which it is composed. This preliminary 
knowledge is as indispensable as that of the language in which 
the instrument is written." (See, also, Jenny Lind 00. v. 
Bower 0; 00., 11 Cal. 194, 198.) 
The extrinsic evidence admissible to furnish the prelimi-
nary knowledge necessary to an understanding of the lan-
guage of the instrument comprises the evidence as to "cir-
cumstances surrounding the parti'9s at the time they con·. 
tracted . . . including the object, nature and subject mat-
ter of the agreement ... and the preliminary negotiations 
between the parties" in order that the court may "place itself 
in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at 
the time of contracting." (Lemm v. Stillwater Land 0; Oattle 
00.,217 Cal. 474, 480 [19 P.2d 7851; Civ. Code, § 1647; Code 
Civ. Proc .. § 1860; Universal Sales 00. v. Oalifornia etc. Mfg. 
00., supra, p. 761.) 
The statement sometimes found in the cases that the 
extrinsic facts are admissible only when a written instru-
ment is ambiguous, simply means that the language used by 
the parties must be susceptible to the meaning claimed to have 
heen intended by the parties. (Balfour v. Fresno Oanal & 
hr. 00.,109 Cal. 221 f41 P. 8761; Smith v. Carlston, 201) Oal. 
541. 550 [271 P. 1091]; Barlow v. Frink, 171 Cal. 165. 172 
[152 P. 2901; Kenney v. Los Feliz Investment Co .. , Ltd., 121 
Cal.App. 378, 386 f9 P.2d 2251; In re Smith's Will, 254 N.Y. 
283 [172 N.E. 499.72 A.L.R. 8671; Goode v. Riley, 153 Mass. 
585 [28 N.E. 228]; Restatement. Oontracts. § 242, comment a; 
Holmes, The Theory of Le{ml lnterprrtrdion. 12 Harv.L.Rev. 
417.420.) If the evidence offered would not persuade a reason-
able man that the instrument meant anything other than the 
ordinary meaning of its words. it is useless. (See Williston. 
Contracts r rev. ed. 1936], § 629.) In the light of the fore-
going principles. the Brownscombe letter was clearly ad-
missible. 
Since there was no written contract. as required by section 
760 of the Probate Oode. to pay respondent a commiRsion on 
the sales to Willig, the judgment should be reversed. The 
rule that a broker must have a contract in order to recover 
for his services. however beneficial they are to the principal. 
if: necessary to protect the principal. who otherwiRe wonld 
frequently be unable to determine whether the price agreed 
upon with the purchaser incluclcil a commiRRion. (See Re-
statement, Agency, §§ 441 Comment (c), 448 Comment (f); 
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Lasoya Oil 00. v. Jarvis, 191 Okla. 213 (127 P.2d 142, ;'142 
A.L.R. 2701; 12 C.J.S. p. 134.) Section 760 of the Probate . 
Code. has adopted this rule, adding the requirement that' the . 
contract be in writing. This formality protects the broker 
from competing claims of others, and the estate from "the 
assertion of -false claims for compensation by brokers and 
agents" (Kleinsorge 0; Heilbron v. Liness, 17 Cal.App.534, . 
538 [120 P. 4441), which would otherwise be a source of liti-
gation, that would sometimes result in the principal's paying. 
the commission twice. (See Sel1.,age v. Talbott, 175Ind .. 648 
f95 N.E. 114. Ann.Cas. 1913 C 724. 33 L.R.A. N. S.9731; 
Barney v. Lasbury, 76 Neb 701 [107 N.W.989] : Annotation 
17 A.L.R 891, 894.) The statute is vitiated. when the courts 
allow a· broker to recover a commission in the absence <?f:~ 
written contract. (White v. Tl irschman, 54 Cal.App.2d· 573, 
574 [129 P.2d 430]; Hicks v. Post~ 154 Cal. 22,.28 [96P. 
878]; Jamison v. Hyde, 141 Cal. 109 [74 P. 695] ; Kleinsorge . 
0; Heilbron v. Liness, S1.tpra, p. 538.) . 
Edmonds, .1., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
13, 1944. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a re-
hearing. 
rL. A. No. 19098. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1 !H4.' 
BYRON PEEBI.JER et aI., Respondents, v. B. C. OLDS et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Appeal_Supersedeas-Order of Supreme Court.-An appli.ca-tion to the Supreme Court for a writ of supersedeas to stay 
execution on a money judgment against defendants was 
granted a.nd it was ordered that the writ should issue on the 
approval of an nnd(>rtaking by the trial or presiding judge 
of the superior ('ourt within R desig-nated time. where the 
showing made by defendantR disclosed an attempt in good 
faith to prevent execution on the jud!l;ment,. pending appeal, 
by the filing of the required bond, the sureties on which had 
sufficiently jnstifipd. 
f11 See 2 Cal.Jur. 467. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Appeal and Error, § 430. 
